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Revenue Sharing in Mining in Africa: Empirical Proxies and Determinants 
of Government Take 
 
Olav Lundstøl 
 
 
Summary  
 
Revenues from mining constitute a significant development opportunity, particularly in 
income-poor but resource-rich countries in Africa. However, there is limited knowledge 
regarding the extent to which such countries have benefitted from the recent global mineral 
boom from 2003-2013. This paper finds existing approaches to testing rent theory to be a 
complicated basis for the assessment of resource revenue sharing between government and 
companies. Exploring instead a proxy focusing on the ratio of the adjusted mining 
contribution to government revenues compared to its contribution to gross domestic product, 
this paper finds levels of mining revenue sharing from 1994-2013 to be well below optimal, 
although improving in recent years. One exception was Botswana, where ownership interest 
also constituted an important element, contributing to 58 per cent of total government 
revenue from mining from 2000-2012. If the other African case countries examined (Ghana, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia) had achieved the same relative ratio of mining 
contribution to the revenue and economy, we estimate that government revenue from mining 
could have been from 2-13 per cent of GDP higher per year on average. The paper finds that 
the main determinants of revenue sharing were tax, price and production levels, with the cost 
of investment and operation much less significant.  
 
Keywords: mining; resource rent; taxation; government take; Africa. 
 
Olav Lundstøl is a PhD candidate at the African Tax Institute, Department of Economics, 
University of Pretoria, South Africa.  
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Introduction  
 
From the middle of the last decade up until recent years, the developing world – and Africa in 
particular – experienced a renewed global race for access to its rich and varied subsoil 
mineral resources. Global annual investment in mining increased from a relatively static low 
of around US$20-30 billion per year in the period 1978-2003, up to US$90-110 billion in 
2010-11 (Humphreys 2011).1 The change fundamentally reflected the onset of the fourth 
super cycle in real prices from the beginning of the 21st century (Cuddington and Jerrett 
2008). 
 
Despite the inherent potential of this resource boom, it is questionable to what extent Africa 
benefitted much from this increase in investment, production and exports beyond the effects 
on employment and the local economy. There are several indications that the benefit sharing 
of revenues between government and companies was limited. From 2002-2010, global 
mining sector income increased by a factor of 4.6, whereas the resource tax paid increased 
by only 1.15 per cent (Laporte and Quatrebarbes 2015).  
 
Subsoil assets often form an important part of the national wealth and are exhaustible in the 
specific locations they come from, although the combined effects of demand and 
investments, together with technological progress, have tended to lead to growing levels of 
many mineral resources both nationally and globally over time. Effective regulation of the 
exploration and extraction of minerals is fraught with difficulties due to the presence of well-
recognised information asymmetry, high associated risk, high sunk costs, integrated 
multinational resource companies, and potentially significant rents.  
 
Considering this complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that the literature on mineral 
government take2 has tended to depart from model mine simulations (Daniel, Keen and 
McPherson 2010; IMF 2012). More recently however, company accounts and stock 
exchange filings, mainly from US firms, have also been utilised in a few studies to try to 
estimate the government take (McMillan and Waxman 2007; IMF 2012). Some recent 
resource revenue data sets have also been produced, including one for Africa from 1980-
2010, although completeness remains an issue (Prichard, Cobham and Goodall 2014; 
Mansour 2014).  
 
Given the difficulties experienced by many resource-rich but still income-poor developing 
countries in optimising their potential non-renewable resource revenue share, this paper 
aims first to review briefly the most relevant parts of the literature on resource rent. Second, it 
provides a conceptual framework for the benchmarking of the levels of government take 
(mainly tax, royalty and ownership interest) in a selection of the main mining countries in 
Africa. Third, it assembles and uses data sets for the period 1994-2013 for the selected 
African countries, including two of the main global mining countries for comparison. Finally, 
through a panel regression, the determinants of the level of government take in mining are 
studied, focusing on price, production, investment and an estimated tax rate (combining 
corporate tax and royalty).  
 
  
                                                 
1 Calculated in US$ prices. 
2  Defined here to include mainly tax, royalty and ownership interests. In the majority of this work, with the clear exceptions 
of Chile and Botswana (their cases will be addressed specifically), it will include tax and royalty. 
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1  Literature review  
 
1.1 The theory and empirics of resource rent  
 
There is a significant literature regarding the importance of economic rent related to the 
extraction of mineral resources. In 1817, Ricardo developed one of the earliest 
representations of the concept of rent in mining (Ricardo 1817: Chapter 3). In his view, this 
depended on differences in the quality of mines (quantity and grade). Rent would vary 
according to the differences in the resulting cost levels, as the market price was equal to the 
cost of the lowest quality mine. All the other mines would then be able to collect a profit with 
a rising level of rent depending on the quality of the mine.  
 
Almost a century later, Gray (1914) introduced the issue of exhaustibility and royalty as a 
depreciation charge for the reduction in location-specific resource reserves. Hotelling (1931) 
then formalised the equilibrium conditions for such a resource: equal to when the price of an 
exhaustible resource grew at a rate equal to the rate of interest. From then onwards, this has 
been known as the fundamental principle in the economics of exhaustible resources.  
 
Much of the literature following Hotelling has further formalised several of the issues he 
recognised in his contribution as possible deviations from the rule (Devarajan and Fisher 
1981). These include the effects of technology (Dasgupta and Heal 1974); imperfect 
competition (Solow 1974); resource quality (Solow and Wan 1976); diminishing returns and 
uncertainty regarding the supply and demand functions and resulting equilibrium outcomes 
where there is a tendency to observe a declining scarcity rent as the finite resource is 
extracted (Heal 1976).  
 
Several contributions in the economics of exhaustible resources followed in the late 1970s to 
early 2000s, emphasising the possibility of exhaustibility at specific mine sites with overall 
inexhaustible resources (Pindyck 1978 and Levhari and Pindyck 1981); the influence of large 
sunk costs, resource uncertainty and technology effects on the level of mineral rent (Siebert 
1983; Farzin 1992; Reynolds 1998); different strategies to test the Hotelling rule, scarcity rent 
overestimation due to disparity in the change of mineral price and interests and finally, 
varying levels of return on real and financial assets (Miller and Upton 1985; Adelman 1994; 
Slade and Thille 1997). According to Livernois, Thille and Zhang 2006 and Lin and Wagner 
2007, using the stock and discount values of natural resources such as old growth timber 
(close to the case of exhaustible resources), the Hotelling rule holds for the majority of 
minerals in the period from 1970-2004.  
 
Krautkramer (1998) reviews the main issues addressed in the economic literature on non-
renewable resources. He concludes that the Hotelling model has not been consistent with 
the empirical findings over the last 125 years but rather that there have been varying 
movements whose direction can depend on the period chosen. Withagen (1998), in a review 
of the literature on the empirical implications of the Hotelling rule, concludes that the testing 
so far in any formulation has encountered difficulties due to the frequent non-availability of in-
situ prices and limited information on the decision-making basis of resource owners. 
Livernois (2009), in a similar review of the empirical literature on the Hotelling rule, states 
that nothing observed concerning resource prices invalidates the theory. He finds, however, 
that technological change, adjusted expectations regarding the resource base, and the 
market structure have had more influence on the path of resource prices.  
 
Tilton (2004) concludes that in the very long run there are no rents in mining. He suggests 
that governments should maximise the net present value of the social benefits gained from 
mining, which unfortunately are also difficult to measure in practice. Hart and Spiro (2011) 
argue that the empirical literature, simple calculations, historic and future rents, and possible 
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theoretical explanations all indicate that Hotelling scarcity type rents have been only 
marginal, are not important today and will not be in the future.  
 
1.2 Resource rent, national wealth and illicit financial flow  
 
As discussed above, there are different opinions regarding whether at a larger scale –  at a 
regional or global level in particular, but also at the country level – mineral resources in 
practical terms really are exhaustible, or whether it is more an issue of investment and 
technology as confirmed resource levels tend to grow (Hagiou 1998; Bratland 2008). 
 
According to Hartwick (1977 and 1978), building on Solow’s model of equilibrium in social 
equity and exhaustible resources, a savings-investment rule is present. It says that society 
should utilise the rents from the current extraction of exhaustible resources to invest in 
reproducible capital, to maintain over time per capita consumption. Departing from this, the 
World Bank, as described first in Kunte, Hamilton, Dixon and Clemens (1998), developed 
further methodologies and a global project to estimate national wealth and implicit adjusted 
saving rates over time, to account for the use and depletion of both renewable and non-
renewable natural resources, including minerals.  
 
Particularly relevant for mineral-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was the finding, 
as shown in Hamilton and Ley (2011), that for several years – and especially during the last 
super cycle from early 2000 – there were negative adjusted national savings in SSA overall 
and for several of the major mineral-rich countries such as Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana. 
This meant overall that national wealth was shrinking. The empirical estimate of national 
wealth incorporating mineral depletion, however, is also linked to the challenge of measuring 
reserve levels and valuing the depletion to calculate the rent element.  
 
Neumayer (2000a), Rubio (2004) and Domingo Lopez-Dee (2007) discuss the 
methodologies utilised and the results. They criticise in particular the underlying thinking in 
the predominant methods utilised that use either constant rents or increasing rents over time 
in line with the Hotelling rule. Commonly, they emphasise technological change as the 
missing element. According to Neumayer (2000b), World Bank findings for SSA (from a 1997 
report) that for 14 years the region’s extended net savings (an earlier version of the adjusted 
national savings method developed) were negative, was reduced to only four years when 
applying the El-Serafy user cost method. Similarly, Gelb, Kaiser and Vinuela (2012) find that 
when resource discovery driven by investments and technological change is included, the 
national wealth estimate and the associated rent and adjusted savings levels move upwards.  
 
Nevertheless, the conclusion from the above literature is not to argue against the presence of 
mineral rents at the mine level nor in fact necessarily at the national and overall level. Gelb 
and Grassman (2010), Collier and Venables (2011) and Barma, Kaiser, Minh Le and Vinuela 
(2012) all argue that there is significant rent in extractive industries over time and that 
capturing, saving and investing and spending should be carried out in such a way that 
income and welfare are sustainably increased.  
 
Ajayi and Ndikumana (2015) include a summary of the literature on illicit financial flow (IFF) 
with an emphasis on Africa and significant new contributions. They emphasise that the 
natural resource sectors, including mining, are central to understanding capital flight and 
related tax evasion, tax avoidance and lost revenue for the governments and countries in 
Africa. In the area of tax avoidance and tax planning, normative work by the OECD intends to 
address base erosion and profit shifting by multinational companies. Increasingly, this work 
has also included developing countries both through regional and country representation 
(100+ countries are now involved). Oguttu (2016) has assessed the relevance of this 
considering the main threats to the tax base in Africa and possible actions to address these.  
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The political economy of natural resources and non-renewable resources such as minerals is 
key to understanding differences over time between countries with similar endowments. 
According to Collier (2010), the quality of the political system is closely related to the social 
value of the natural assets. If the political system (and inherent in this the key institutions) 
remain underdeveloped while the natural resource sector has become important in the 
economy, then the social value of the natural assets are unlikely to be realised at a high 
level. Beuran, Raballand and Kapoor (2011), Kolstad and Wiig (2008) and Bigsten, Mulenga 
and Olsson (2010), emphasise the importance of the time consistency problem, inclusive 
political systems, impartiality-enhancing institutions and political incentives linked to rent from 
natural resources revenue sharing, including the petroleum and mining sector in particular.  
 
 
2  Conceptual framework 
 
Does the literature review prove that there is limited evidence of the presence of resource 
rent in mining over time? This author thinks not and believes that the confusion is due more 
to problems with existing real data and associated calculations that in many cases seem 
unreliable both in time and across types of minerals.  
 
The fundamental reason for this is the tendency to rely on average cost and revenue 
numbers and/or indexes that translate more often than not into calculating gross margins 
(value of sales less the cost of extraction) and not rents. Estimating the latter would require 
as Solow (1993: 166) has pointed out, firstly: ‘a numerical approximation to the marginal cost 
of mining’, and secondly, an adjustment of observed market prices to remove distortions, in 
order to calculate the rent.  
 
In reality, even distinguishing between Ricardian (which represents a depreciation charge or 
payment for an exhaustible factor of production) and Hotelling rent is not straightforward in 
most overall calculations that are undertaken. This is illustrated in Bjerkholt (2004: 8) where 
the two are theoretically expressed and separated but where it is noted that it is common to 
denote the complete value of the two as the Hotelling rent. In the same analysis, a relatively 
smaller share of the excess profit was identified as Hotelling rent. This is in line with what 
much of the literature summarised above also concluded.  
 
2.1 Benchmarking revenue sharing through value added and government take 
ratios 
 
One of the fundamental tasks in resource revenue management is to secure, as much as 
possible, an optimal government take without discouraging exploration and extraction. This 
requires, as emphasised by Collier and Venables (2011) and Hamilton and Ley (2011), that 
the country captures a significant share of the resource rent and saves and invests or spends 
this share in such a way as to ensure increased national productivity and wealth over time.  
 
Linked to this reasoning, we introduce here a simple principle put forward by Conrad (2012: 
14) that: ‘Mineral revenues should be a greater share of total revenue relative to the sector 
value added because government is collecting royalties on a factor of production, a 
phenomenon unique to the mining industry’.3   
 
To make progress in the assessment of the actual revenue sharing that has been taking 
place in resource-rich mineral economies in SSA, a comprehensive definition of mineral 
                                                 
3 This is definitely not exclusive to mining and could apply to petroleum and in theory any non-renewable resource. 
Similarly, it could be relevant to other types of rent occurring or created in the economy as well. 
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revenues collected by government that goes beyond traditional rent concepts is used. The 
emphasis in what follows is on the share captured by the government, the so-called 
government take. This will include in principle revenues such as taxes, fees, royalty and 
ownership interests, but exclude employee-related fees and taxes sometimes deducted by 
companies and included in tax aggregations.  
 
The revenue focused on here is government take in the country that is the origin of the 
resource, and in mining, this is primarily tax on profit, royalty and ownership interest income. 
The gross value-added data utilised herein has been collected from the national accounts, 
where either the SNA (System of National Accounts) from 1993 or 2008 have been utilised 
(see www.unstats.un.org under national accounts for details4), and within this the production 
approach whereby either reported market values or export values are deducted from the 
intermediate inputs.  
 
 
3  Proxies of revenue sharing through value 
added and government take ratios 
 
3.1 Country selection, time period, indicators and ratios 
 
The analysis below builds on mining-related national revenue and value-added data for a 
selection of five of the dominant mining countries in SSA – South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, 
Tanzania and Zambia – that together account for above 70 per cent of the output of key 
minerals such as copper, coal, platinum, gold and diamonds in the region throughout the 
period studied. The analysis also includes two international advanced mining countries, 
Australia and Chile, that respectively account for a major percentage of key minerals output 
globally.  
 
The time period from 1994-2013 incorporates elements of what have been seen as both low 
and high real price cycles in the global minerals market and industries (Cuddington and 
Jerrett 2008), with a general break from around 2003-4, although this somewhat depends on 
the mineral in question. See Appendix 1 for tables with explanations regarding the indicators 
and ratios, with the accompanying definitions, sources and underlying data for the analysis 
below.  
 
3.2 Value added, government take, and resource revenue ratios 
 
The main ratios calculated herein to estimate approximations of the degree to which there 
has been resource revenue sharing between the government and the companies throughout 
the 20-year period in the selected countries are examined below. There are a wide range of 
experiences across the sample of countries regarding how important the mining sector was 
in terms of: i) its direct contribution (MGDP) to the total gross domestic product (TGDP), ii) its 
export (ME) as a share of total gross domestic product, and iii) its direct contributions (MGT) 
to the total government revenue (TR).5 
 
To assess to what extent the importance of the mining sector in the economy (GDP and 
export) has been reflected when it comes to its contribution to government revenues, two 
ratios are calculated here. The reason why we include the second indicator and the data on 
                                                 
4  https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/1993sna.pdf 
 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/sna2008.pdf 
5  The TR is adjusted for different levels of non-mining government revenues and employee-related taxes are deducted, 
since they are not included in the mining-related revenue MGT. See Appendix 1 for details. 
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mineral exports is to provide an alternative way to approximate its actual contribution to the 
economy, in particular for countries where the national account data did not reflect 
adequately the economic realities of the sector, mainly due to delayed rebasing and the use 
of old input-output ratios throughout most of the period. We find this confirmed in particular 
for Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania overall and especially for the period after 2004, when 
examining the differences between MGDP/TGDP and ME/TGDP.  
 
Table 1 Averages for the period 1994-2013 
 
 
It is clear from the table that Botswana has been by far the most successful country in this 
sample when it comes to securing a high government take in mining. It has shares of 1.94 
and 1.80 for the two calculated ratios ((MGT/TR: MGDP/TGDP) (ratio 1) and (MGT/TR: 
ME/TGDP) (ratio 2)) of the degree of revenue sharing with government considering its 
contribution to the economy. This was significantly above the identified average benchmark 
of 1.  
 
Second to Botswana in this sample is Chile with ratios of 1.44 (ratio 1) and 1.21 (ratio 2). 
Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, two of the leading global mining countries in the sample, 
South Africa and Australia, are close to the bottom of the sample for both ratios calculated, 
with 0.35 (ratio 1) and 0.37 (ratio 2), and 0.53 (ratio 1) and 0.47 (ratio 2) respectively.  
 
Some of the explanation for this could be related to differences in terms of the age and cost 
of many mines; the main minerals involved (iron ore and coal dominate); and sales/market 
characteristics (domestic, industrial and energy use). Some variance in the ratios between 
the countries would therefore be expected. Part of the differences in costs, prices and 
margins have however been removed through the ratio calculation itself. The exhaustible 
nature of the resources, as explained, also provides a solid case for average ratios above 
1.00. 
 
When mining export is used as a share of GDP, Ghana and Zambia, which have significantly 
higher ratios than 1, with 1.33 and 1.10, end up at similar levels to South Africa and 
Australia, with 0.34 and 0.39 respectively (ratio 2). Overall, the averages show that the 
majority of the countries in the sample are above the benchmark of 1 for ratio 1 (the average 
is 1.17), whereas for ratio 2, most (Botswana and Chile are the only exceptions) are below 
(the average is 0.77).  
 
In the sub-period from 1994-2003, characterised by lower mineral prices, the average for all 
the countries was 0.69 (ratio 1) and 0.58 (ratio 2), and Zambia had ratios as low as 0.14 
(ratio 1) and 0.08 (ratio 2). In all sub-periods and overall, Chile and Botswana had by far the 
highest ratios. From 2004-2013, the real mineral prices increased and the overall average 
ratios for all the countries were 1.55 (ratio 1) and 0.89 (ratio 2). All countries in this period 
moved towards the indicated benchmark, although most, and in particular for ratio 2, still 
remained significantly below.  
 
MGDP/TGDP ME/TGDP MGT/TR MGT/TR: MGDP/TGDP MGT/TR: ME/TGDP
Ghana 2.80 8.60 3.10 1.33 0.34
South Africa 7.30 7.20 2.70 0.35 0.37
Zambia 10.50 24.40 11.50 1.10 0.39
Australia 11.20 11.40 5.50 0.53 0.47
Tanzania 2.83 4.60 4.50 1.47 0.78
Chile 10.70 13.16 14.90 1.44 1.21
Botsw ana 27.60 29.70 51.90 1.94 1.80
Average 10.42 14.15 13.44 1.17 0.77
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It is important to note here that there are large differences between mining countries in terms 
of multiplier effects. There is little doubt, for example, that Australia and South Africa have 
relatively strong local and national firms (several of which are significant global mining 
conglomerates) with developed supply chains and value added. The above could mean that 
a higher share of retained profits and privately appropriated rent is benefitting the national 
economy. However, noting the increasing globalisation in the mining industry6 and the close 
links to offshore economies facilitated by secrecy jurisdictions, as well as rising levels of 
inequality in many countries, it remains highly relevant how and to what extent the resource 
benefits and rents are shared in the source country as well.  
 
3.3 Ownership interests and government take 
 
From the findings above, it is clear that the only two countries in the sample that have been 
able to deliver a mining government take over time above the expected benchmark ratio are 
Botswana and Chile. They are also the only countries in the sample where government 
ownership interests have constituted a very significant7 continuous element in the mining 
government take over time. 
 
In the case of Chile, it is possible to distinguish clearly between the sources of production, 
export, investment and government take contributions due to elaborate statistics. In the 
period from 1994-2013, the ownership interest in the state-owned CODELCO (Corporación 
Nacional del Cobre de Chile – National Copper Corporation of Chile) delivered 71 per cent of 
the average annual mining government take. Over the same period, CODELCO accounted 
for only 35 per cent of the national mining production and 43 per cent of the national mining 
investment.  
 
In Botswana, it is more difficult to perform a similar analysis for the entire period examined 
here as for most years ownership interest, as measured through dividend from Debswana,8 
is mixed with royalty and tax payments in the statistics. However, data for the period 2000-
2012 has recently become available in Jefferis 2013. In this period, ownership interests 
through dividends contributed 58 per cent of the mining government take in the country.  
 
A rough approximation is provided here based on available data from CODELCO (2011) and 
Jefferis (2013) combined with the other relevant country statistics and sources referred to 
above. For Botswana, the period covered is 2000-12, a total of 13 years, and for Chile it is 
2004-2013, a total of 10 years. Estimates of adjusted accumulated public-sector capital 
investment/stock in the firm in question (here Debswana and CODELCO) are used. Three 
different rates of interest are applied to deduct an annual capital cost from the received 
annual dividend/ownership interest payment.  
 
Table 2 Adjusted mining revenue ratio estimates 
  
 
 
                                                 
6 The Reserve Bank of Australia in 2011 stated that foreign interests owned around 80 per cent of mining operations and 
that the economy was experiencing smaller spillover effects and increased imports, and large benefits and profits were 
going offshore (Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2011: 43 
www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2011/nov/pdf/1111.pdf). 
7  Most of the other countries also have government ownership interests, e.g. Ghana, Zambia (ZCCM and today ZCCM-
IH) and Tanzania (STAMICO); however, in terms of the mining government take in the periods examined here, the net 
revenue from this has either been negative or not very significant in most years. 
8  Debswana is a joint venture between the government of Botswana and the South African diamond company De Beers: 
each party owns 50 per cent of the company. 
MGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP AMGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP (6%) AMGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP (14%) AMGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP (20%)
Botsw ana (2000-12) 2.17 1.97 1.9 1.86
Chile (2004-13) 1.51 1.45 1.37 1.31
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The results above indicate for both Chile and Botswana that after adjusting for a possible 
range of capital costs associated with the accumulated public investment in the public 
commercial mining companies, the contribution of ownership interests through dividend or 
similar remains a significant part of the mining government take. Looking at the mining 
sector’s contributions to government revenues as compared with its value-added contribution 
to the national economy, the ratios are above the Conrad principle of >1.00 (see p.9), with a 
range from 1.97-1.86 (for ratio 1) for Botswana from 2000-12, as compared to the original 
2.17 without the capital cost adjustments. For Chile, the range is 1.45-1.31 (for ratio 1) from 
2004-13 compared to the original 1.51 prior to capital cost adjustments.  
 
Finally, there is little doubt that Botswana in many ways represents what Auty (2008: 5) has 
called ‘a best practice counterfactual’ among mineral-rich economies in Africa. The 
combination of beneficial diamond prices due to an overwhelming control of both the global 
sales through De Beers (where Botswana also has a minority shareholding globally through 
Debswana) and large production volumes, with effective cost controls and revenue 
management, has produced a beneficial outcome for the country.  
 
3.4 Adjusted resource revenue ratios and government take  
 
In this section, the implications on mining government take are simulated for the countries in 
the sample by utilising alternative resource revenue sharing ratios. Ratio 2 (MGT/TR: 
ME/TGDP) is used, due to the inaccuracy of the estimates for ratio 1 in particular for the low-
income countries in the sample (Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania). A striking difference can be 
observed with the remaining higher income countries in the sample (South Africa, Australia, 
Chile and Botswana). Three alternative resource revenue sharing ratios are calculated: i) the 
average across the seven countries (AMGT or A), ii) the Conrad ratio (CMGT or C, equal to 
1.00) and iii) the highest among the seven countries (HMGT or H, here Botswana). In 
addition, the original estimate of MGT for each country is included as a point of departure 
(OMGT or O).  
 
The impact on the simulated mining government take shown below is presented both in 
terms of the adjusted average annual mining government take in millions of US$ and as a 
percentage change from the original mining government take. See Appendix 1 for tables with 
explanations regarding the indicators and ratios, and the accompanying definitions and 
sources for the analysis below.  
 
Table 3 Adjusted MGT 1994-2013 (in annual average millions of US$ and percentage 
change)9 
 
 
Not surprisingly, considering the findings in Table 1, it is South Africa, Ghana, Zambia and 
Australia that would have increased the mining government take most through reaching the 
average benchmark or the highest relative ratio as measured above. The range of increase 
in annual mining government take collected for South Africa and Ghana would be from 108-
                                                 
9 OMGT – Original Mining Government Take; AMGT – Average Mining Government Take; CMGT – Conrad Mining 
Government Take and HMGT – Highest Mining Government Take. 
OMGT AMGT CMGT HMGT A-O/O C-O/O H-O/O
Ghana 192 436 565 1019 126% 194% 429%
South Africa 1617 3365 4370 7865 108% 170% 386%
Zambia 317 626 813 1462 97% 156% 362%
Australia 10000 17000 22000 40000 64% 113% 283%
Tanzania 102 101 131 235 -1% 28% 131%
Chile 4783 3044 3953 7115 -36% -17% 49%
Botsw ana 1481 634 823 1481 -57% -44% 0%
14 
 
386 per cent and 126-429 per cent respectively. For the other countries such as Zambia and 
Australia, the increases in annual mining government take would be very significant with 
ranges of 97-362 per cent and 64-283 per cent respectively.   
 
To analyse this further, Table 4 below considers how these simulated increases in annual 
average mining government take compare to the levels of GDP and TR over the period. The 
impact here varies slightly from the above and this is due to how important mining as a 
sector is in relative terms in each of these countries as measured here.  
 
The largest impact is seen here for Zambia, where the change in the ratio of the estimated 
rent sharing gives a range of increase equivalent to a share of GDP of between 3-13 per 
cent, and equivalent to a share of TR of between 14-55 per cent. These are very significant 
increases and illustrate the potential size of the ‘foregone’ mining government take over the 
period. The second country in terms of effect is Ghana, followed by Australia, South Africa 
and Tanzania.  
 
Table 4 Adjusted MGT as percentage of GDP and TR for 1994-2013  
 
 
 
4  Determinants of resource revenue sharing 
measured through government take  
 
As seen above, there is a wide-ranging empirical experience of resource revenue sharing in 
the sample countries as measured in different ways through the ratios.  
 
This section will attempt to delve further into some of the possible explanatory factors behind 
how the resource value is distributed between company profit and government take, such as 
mineral price, production, investment, cash costs and tax. To test the effect of these on 
mining government take, we attempt to estimate the source of variations by panel 
regressions in Stata (a statistical software package).  
 
The data (see Appendix 2 for details) for mineral prices, production, investment and tax is 
from various official country-level sources for all the seven countries over the 20-year period. 
The sample size utilised in this regression is admittedly very small, involving only seven 
countries over a 20-year period. It is therefore possibly somewhat problematic to assume 
asymptotic behaviour despite the fact that the Hausman test is positive for the full sample in 
Stata.  
 
A simple correlation exercise shows a relatively close positive connection between the MGT 
and the four independent variables (price, production, investment and tax), ranging from 
(A-O)/GDP (C-O)/GDP (H-O)/GDP (A-O)/TR (C-O)/TR (H-O)/TR
Ghana 1.3 % 2.0 % 4.4 % 6.1 % 9.4 % 20.8 %
South Africa 0.8 % 1.2 % 2.8 % 2.1 % 3.4 % 7.7 %
Zambia 3.5 % 5.6 % 13.0 % 14.8 % 23.7 % 54.8 %
Australia 0.8 % 1.4 % 2.2 % 2.6 % 4.5 % 11.3 %
Tanzania -0.01% 0.2 % 2.0 % -0.1 % 2.0 % 9.1 %
Chile -1.3 % -0.6 % 3.0 % -6.3 % -3.0 % 8.5 %
Botsw ana -8.7 % -6.8 % 0.0 % -23.0 % -17.8 % 0.0 %
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0.48-0.79 over the entire time period. For primarily gold (Tanzania and Ghana), copper 
(Zambia and Chile) and mixed (Australia, South Africa and Botswana) mining producing 
countries separated in subgroups, the correlation is on average higher.  
 
Table 5 below shows the regression estimation results for the link between within-country 
and between-country variations and mining government take, and the within-country and 
between-country variations in mineral prices, production, investment and tax rates. 
 
Table 5 Regression explaining mining government take  
(in natural log transformation) 
 
 
For all the countries,10 by far the strongest effect was associated with an increase in the tax 
rate (4.63), followed by price increase (1.49) and production increase (0.58). While the effect 
of a marginal increase in the first three variables mentioned was strongly significant (all with 
p<0.01), the investment effect was not found to be significant at conventional levels.  
 
Using the R-square decomposition analysis (REGO) we estimate that the mineral tax rate, 
price, and production explain 58, 30 and 12 per cent, respectively, of the variance in the 
dependent variable of mining government take in the sample. The collinearity seems to be 
acceptable with a variance inflation factor (VIF) at 1.5-4 and low correlation rates between 
these variables.  
 
Looking at the subgroups of mixed (South Africa and Australia), gold (Tanzania and Ghana) 
and copper (Chile and Zambia) countries, we see that tax remains by far the most significant 
variable, although with a shift in the sign to negative for the mixed. Mineral prices remain a 
significant variable for two of the three subgroups. 
 
Cash costs or a variable on operating costs were not included in the analysis above. 
However, an earlier analysis did include these through utilising the MGDP in the calculation 
of proxies of revenue sharing as in principle the cash costs are included in the deduction 
from the gross mining value added.  
                                                 
10  The panel was slightly unbalanced due to four missing years of MGT in the Tanzania data (1994-97). 
All Mix Gold Copper
ln (price) 1.494*** 0.422 1.528*** 1.832***
(0.158) (0.430) (0.196) (0.332)
ln (production) 0.581*** -0.052 0.433*** 0.959
(0.134) (0.591) (0.117) (0.564)
ln (investment) 0.105 0.692*** 0.244**  - 0.443
(0.107) (0.219) (0.115) (0.258)
ln (tax) 4.632*** -4.220** 4.768*** 6.704***
(0.691) (1.640) (1.176) (1.487)
Observations 136                  40                    36              40              
Countries 7                      2                      2                2                
Fixed or random effects Fixed Fixed Random Random
R-sq adj 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.96
***p or z <0.01 ** p or z<0.05 * p or Z<0.1
prob>chi2 (Hausman) 0.004               0.002               0.956         0.257         
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The reason for these non-inclusions above was the relative unavailability of comparable time 
series data on cash costs in mining. In Table 6 below, however, for five out of the seven 
countries studied in this paper, some available time series data on cash costs (for the most 
part C111) is included with other data for the period 2001-12. Overall, the variable of cash 
costs is not significant concerning the mining government take. The other independent 
variables are however strongly significant.  
 
It is important to note that in the below and above tables the analysis only assesses the 
influence of changes in the independent variables (price, production, investment, cash costs 
and tax) on the value of the dependent variable MGT in the time period 1994-2013. 
Obviously, for example, the fiscal regimes of Botswana and other countries, which were 
mainly established prior to 1994, were still one of or the major factor(s) contributing to the 
high levels of MGT collected in later years. Another important note is that the different 
countries covered in this study and in its data analysis are key mining countries that are 
dominated by different minerals and metals in terms of market conditions both domestically 
and internationally.  
 
Table 6 Regression explaining mining government take for Australia, Botswana,  
Chile, South Africa and Tanzania (in natural log transformation) 
 
 
  
                                                 
11  C1 costs are direct costs, which include costs incurred in mining and processing (labour, power, reagents, materials) 
plus local general and administrative, freight and realisation and selling costs. 
 
Australia, Botswana, Chile, South Africa and Tanzania
ln (price) 0.98***
(0.24)
ln (production) 2.63***
(0.58)
ln (investment) 0.51***
(0.12)
ln (cash cost) -0.06
(0.11)
ln (tax) 6.1***
(1.27)
Observations 60
Countries 5
Fixed or random Random
R-square adj 0.85
***p or z <0.01 ** p or z<0.05 * p or Z<0.1
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5  Conclusion 
 
The primary aim of the analysis in this study has been to investigate resource revenue 
sharing between government and companies in key mining countries in SSA over an 
extended period, to explore an important aspect of benefit sharing that has not so far been 
well covered in the literature of extractives resource management.  
 
The study summarises how the concept of resource rent emerged in the literature. It 
examines the findings of previous studies’ attempts to test this concept against empirical 
data. It shows that it can be questioned to what degree the theory really has been tested, 
and illustrates some of the challenges related to doing this. From this the study adopts a 
concept of the degree of efficiency in the sharing between government and companies, and 
departs from this to examine the ratio of the relative contributions of mining to government 
revenues and gross domestic product.  
 
The study’s findings, covering seven resource-rich countries in the period 1994-2013, show a 
wide variety of experiences, with major African mining countries like Zambia, Ghana and 
Tanzania collecting significantly below what could be called optimal levels of mining 
government take throughout the period. More surprising perhaps is the finding that well-
established developed mining countries like Australia and South Africa did not do much 
better in relative terms when the ratios of the contribution of mining to government revenues 
and gross domestic product were assessed.  
 
These differences in the degree of efficiency of collecting resource revenues in mining in key 
mining countries in Africa had a significant impact on the overall ability of the state to fund its 
own development throughout this period. The estimated impact varied from 2-13 per cent of 
GDP in lower mining-related revenues collected per year from 1994-2013 when 
benchmarking against the lead country during the period, Botswana, and for several 
countries was also significant when comparing to the average in the group of countries 
studied.  
 
Botswana and Chile stand out as the two clear exceptions in the sample throughout the 
period studied (1994-2013), with significantly higher ratios of mining contribution to 
government revenues relative to the sector contribution to gross domestic product (1.80 and 
1.21 versus an average of 0.77 when examining ratio 2 in Table 1). In both cases, the 
ownership interests either in fully owned (CODELCO in Chile) or majority owned (Debswana 
in Botswana) state commercial companies accounted for a dominant, although somewhat 
declining, share over the period (71 per cent in Chile and 58 per cent in Botswana). The 
study also shows, through the example of Botswana in particular, that on average this 
ownership interest and associated investment were highly profitable throughout the period.  
 
Examining the underlying factors of mining government take in the case countries, the study 
uses a panel regression which examines the influence and explanatory power of often 
mentioned determinants such as mineral prices, production, investment, cash costs and tax 
rate. It finds that by far the most important determinant over the period was the tax rate (the 
study includes only company income tax and royalty in its comprehensive equivalent rate). 
This had an estimated impact that was almost three times as high as the second 
determinant, mineral prices. The study also finds that, contrary to common expectations and 
industry arguments, the level of mining cash costs and investment did not have a significant 
effect on mining government take (when individual country data was examined, the sole 
exception was Chile).  
 
Important in-depth empirical work is still pending, as indicated by Clausing and Durst (2015: 
14) when commenting on available surveys and empirical research on extractive industries 
18 
 
(including mining): ‘Despite the availability of these surveys of practices in different parts of 
the world, however, there appears to be no literature comparing the administrative success 
of different kinds of fiscal regimes in practice’. Such testing and benchmarking must soon 
follow to move increasingly towards evidence-based tax policy and administrative advice and 
assistance suited to different country and development contexts.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Value added, government take and rent indicators, ratios, definitions and sources 
 
Indicators Definition Sources 
MGDP Gross value-added contribution of mining 
sector, using the production approach. In 
local currency unit (LCU). 
National Bureaux of Statistics (Botswana, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, Australia, 
South Africa); Central Bank (Chile). 
ME Mining export value. In US$. IMF reports: Article IV consultations, 
reports on selected issues, staff reports 
(Botswana, Zambia, South Africa); 
Ministry of Finance (Tanzania); Central 
Bank (Ghana); Mining Commission 
(Chile).  
TGDP Total gross domestic production in a 
country. In both LCU and US$. 
IMF WEO (World Economic Outlook) 
database (Tanzania, Australia, Ghana, 
Botswana, Zambia); Central Bank (Chile, 
South Africa).  
MGT Mining government take, measured 
through a mix mainly of company income 
tax (and other related profit taxes), royalty 
and ownership interest. In LCU or US$. 
Employee-related tax not included.  
IMF reports (Botswana); IMF and 
Chamber of Mines reports (South Africa); 
Chamber of Mines and EITI (Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative) reports 
(Ghana); Revenue Authority and EITI 
reports (Tanzania, Zambia); Mining 
Council (Australia); Mining Commission 
(Chile).  
TR Total government revenue (non-tax and 
tax). In LCU or US$. Employee-related 
taxes deducted as this was also done for 
MGT. Adjustment is made for different 
levels of non-mining-related revenue 
through a formula.12 
ICTD global database (supplemented for 
some years with CERDI (Centre d’Etudes 
et de Recherches sur le Développement 
International) SSA regional database).   
 
Ratios Definition Sources 
MGDP/TGDP Mining sector contribution/share of total 
gross domestic product in a country, 
calculated using the gross value added and 
production approach. In percentage.  
See above 
ME/TGDP Mineral export value as a share of total 
gross domestic product. In percentage.  
See above 
MGT/TR Mining government take as a share of total 
government revenue. In percentage.  
See above 
MGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP The relative government revenue collected 
from mining as part of total government 
revenue, compared with the contribution of 
mining to GDP.   
See above 
MGT/TR:ME/TGDP The relative government revenue collected 
from mining in total government revenue, 
compared with share of mining export to 
GDP.   
See above 
 
 
                                                 
12  Non-mining adjustment factor in TR according to the following formula for each country for each year in the period 1994-
2013: TR- ((NMTR/NMGDP difference from average in the seven countries) *((NMTR/TR: NMGDP/TGDP)) *TR). 
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Adjusted resource rent ratios and government take estimates indicators, definitions 
and sources 
 
Indicators Definition Sources 
MGT/TR:ME/TGDP The relative government revenue 
collected from mining in total government 
revenue, compared with share of mining 
export to GDP.   
See above. 
AMGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP (6%) Interest rate of 6% used to deduct from 
the original MGT the annual capital costs 
of the accumulated public investment in a 
mining company where the government 
has ownership interests. This produces 
AMGT. All other factors in the ratio are 
unchanged.  
See above. The 6% interest rate utilised is 
equivalent to a risk-adjusted suggested 
interest rate to be utilised in large public 
investment projects in Norway. 
AMGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP (14%) Interest rate of 14% used to deduct from 
the original MGT the annual capital costs 
of the accumulated public investment in a 
mining company where the government 
has ownership interests. This produces 
AMGT. All other factors in the ratio are 
unchanged.   
See above. The 14% rate is equivalent to 
an average rate found in several mining-
related WACC (weighted average cost of 
capital) analyses and studies globally.  
AMGT/TR:MGDP/TGDP (20%) Interest rate of 20% used to deduct from 
the original MGT the annual capital costs 
of the accumulated public investment in a 
mining company where the government 
has ownership interests. This produces 
AMGT. All other factors in the ratio are 
unchanged. 
See above. The 20% rate is equivalent to 
an above average market interest rate for 
large infrastructure/mining investment.  
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Adjusted indicators and ratios of mining government take  
 
Indicators Definition Sources 
OMGT This is the original annual average 
MGT (mining government take) in the 
currency indicated for the period 
1994-2013.  
IMF reports (Botswana); IMF and Chamber of 
Mines reports (South Africa); Chamber of 
Mines and EITI reports (Ghana); Revenue 
Authority and EITI reports (Tanzania, Zambia); 
Mining Council (Australia); Mining Commission 
(Chile).  
AMGT This is the adjusted annual average 
MGT (mining government take) in the 
currency indicated for the period 
1994-2013, with the average ratio of 
the seven countries 
(MGT/TR:ME/TGDP) used instead of 
the original for the country in 
question.   
IMF reports: Article IV consultations, reports on 
selected issues, staff reports (Botswana, 
Zambia, South Africa); Ministry of Finance 
(Tanzania); Central Bank (Ghana); Mining 
Commission (Chile).  
CMGT This is the adjusted annual average 
MGT (mining government take) in the 
currency indicated for the period 
1994-2013, with the Conrad ratio (of 
1.00) for (MGT/TR:ME/TGDP) used 
instead of the original for the country 
in question.  
IMF reports: Article IV consultations, reports on 
selected issues, staff reports (Botswana, 
Zambia, South Africa); Ministry of Finance 
(Tanzania); Central Bank (Ghana); Mining 
Commission (Chile). 
HMGT This is the adjusted annual average 
MGT (mining government take) in the 
currency indicated for the period 
1994-2013, with the highest average 
ratio in the sample of countries for 
(MGT/TR:ME/TGDP) used instead of 
the original for the country in 
question. 
IMF reports: Article IV consultations, reports on 
selected issues, staff reports (Botswana, 
Zambia, South Africa); Ministry of Finance 
(Tanzania); Central Bank (Ghana); Mining 
Commission (Chile). 
 
Ratios Definition Sources 
A-O/O This is the relative increase in the 
average annual mining government 
take when utilising the average rent 
ratio of the seven countries compared 
to the original for the country.  
  
See above 
C-O/O This is the relative increase in the 
average annual mining government 
take when utilising the Conrad rent 
ratio, set here at 1.00, compared to the 
original for the country.  
See above 
H-O/O This is the relative increase in the 
average annual mining government 
take when utilising the highest rent 
ratio of the seven countries compared 
to the original for the country.  
 
See above 
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Appendix 2  
 
Data for mineral prices, production, investment, tax and cash costs in the country samples. In 
the case of prices, production and cash costs, this data was then indexed using 2010 as the 
base year. For investment, the numbers were translated into millions of US$. For tax, the 
royalty number was transformed into its CIT (company income tax) equivalent and added to 
the CIT number to arrive at a total mineral tax rate for each country in each year. Then all the 
numbers for these independent variables in the panel regression were transformed into LN 
(natural logarithm) before being utilised in the regressions.  
 
Indicator Definition Sources 
Mineral prices For Tanzania and Ghana, the 
international gold price; for Chile and 
Zambia; the copper price; for 
Botswana, the diamond price; for South 
Africa and Australia, price indexes for 
minerals.  
Bureau of Statistics (data cubes) 
(Australia); National Bureau of 
Statistics and IMF reports (Botswana); 
COCHILCO (Comisión Chilena del 
Cobre – Chilean Copper Commission) 
annual reports (Chile and Zambia); 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development) (Tanzania 
and Ghana); Stats SA (Statistics South 
Africa) on domestic mining (South 
Africa).  
Mineral production For Tanzania and Ghana, the number 
of ounces; for Chile and Zambia, 
tonnes of copper; for Botswana, million 
kilotonnes of diamonds; for South 
Africa and Australia, a composite 
minerals index.  
Bureau of Statistics (data cubes) 
(Australia); National Bureau of 
Statistics and IMF reports (Botswana); 
COCHILCO annual reports (Chile); 
Bank of Zambia data file (Zambia); 
British Geological Survey (Tanzania); 
UNCTAD (Ghana); Stats SA on 
domestic mining (South Africa). 
Mineral investment Investment or in some cases capital 
expenditure per year. Measured in US$ 
equivalent.   
Bureau of Statistics (data cubes) and 
Australian Mining Council (Australia); 
Report by Keith Jefferis, 2013 (see 
references) (Botswana); COCHILCO 
annual reports (Chile); Bank of Zambia 
data file (Zambia); aggregate from 
company reports and TMAA (Tanzania 
Minerals Audit Agency) reports 
(Tanzania); IMF reports and Chamber 
of Mines reports (Ghana); IMF reports 
for earlier years and Chamber of Mines 
reports (South Africa).  
Mineral tax Aggregate of CIT and royalty, where 
the latter is calculated as the equivalent 
in CIT terms. A useful proxy for 
average mineral tax as these are by far 
the dominating government take 
instruments in the period in most 
countries when employee-related taxes 
are removed.  
Global and country-level PWC 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers) reports, as 
well as other reports.  
Mineral cash cost Here C1 was mainly used, when 
available, as other measures include 
investment/capital expenditure, and 
this was included in the 
investment/capital expenditure 
variable.  
Various company reports online 
(Tanzania); COCHILCO reports (Chile); 
Chamber of Mines reports (South 
Africa); Report by Keith Jefferis, 2013 
(Botswana).  
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